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The effect of bidder conservatism on M&A decisions: Text-based evidence from US 10-
K filings 
 
Abstract: 
This paper examines whether and how bidders’ conservative tone in 10-K filings influences 
the subsequent mergers and acquisitions (M&A) investment decisions of these US firms from 
1996 to 2013. Based on 39,260 firm-year observations, we find, consistent with behavioural 
consistency theory, that conservative bidders are less likely to engage in M&A deals. Further, 
those that decide to engage in M&As are likely to acquire public targets and within-industry 
firms. These bidders are inclined to employ more stock acquisitions than cash acquisitions. 
Our results also indicate that conservative bidders experience abnormally poor stock returns 
around the announcements of M&A investments. This provides new insights on the 
mechanism through which bidders’ sentiments influence shareholders’ wealth. Overall, these 
findings highlight the implications of the textual sentiment of corporate disclosure for the 
forecasting of corporate investment and financing decisions. Our results have practical 
implications, since they shed light on the value relevance of the information content of major 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)-mandated 10-K filings.  
 
Keywords: Textual sentiment, Bidders’ conservative tone, Behavioural consistency theory, 
Risk averse, Payment method, Market reaction, Types of acquisitions.  
JEL classification: G02, G32, G34 
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1. Introduction 
The textual analysis of corporate disclosure provides insights into managerial 
expectations and identifies important qualifiers and caveats that are absent from financial 
measures (Loughran & McDonald, 2015a). Barber and Odean (2008) and Engelberg and 
Parsons (2011) document that the sentiment of qualitative corporate news drives market 
trading. Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, and Segal (2010) find that the disclosure tone of the 
10-K has incremental information content beyond that of financial measures. Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) observe that firms that convey more negative tones in their 10-K filings 
experience negative market reactions around the filing dates. Arnold, Fishe, and North (2010) 
quantify the words used in the risk factors sections of IPO prospectuses and find that they 
capture most of the IPO returns. Yan (2015) shows that the tone of 10-Ks gives accurate 
predictions of firms’ long-term performance. Thus, extant literature suggests that words 
selected by managers in textual corporate communications have significant predictive power 
for firms’ future stock returns, earnings, and performance. However, relatively little is known 
about whether the sentiment of corporate disclosure could be employed to anticipate 
investment activity. This paper addresses this gap by investigating the impact of textual 
sentiment on corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) investment decisions.
1
 
Further, Ferris, Hao, and Liao (2013) introduce the concept of issuer conservatism, 
measured as the proportion of negative words in the IPO prospectus. They find that issuer 
conservatism is inversely related to subsequent operating and stock return performance.
2
 We 
adopt the same proxy of the proportion of negative tone in the 10-K to examine the effect of 
textual conservatism on M&A decisions. M&A deals constitute one of the most strategic 
                                                          
1
 Kearney and Liu (2014) argue that the textual sentiment of corporate disclosure provides a good reflection of 
firms’ internal and external conditions and thus has significant power to explain subsequent corporate 
investment decisions. 
 
2
 In line with that, Tetlock, Saar‐Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) find that the proportion of negative words 
in firms’ specific news stories forecast firms’ future earnings and returns above and beyond stock analysts’ 
forecasts and historical accounting data. 
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investment decisions, with substantial effects on firms’ current and future value (Custódio & 
Metzger, 2013). The 10-K is a major and critical public document that provides a 
comprehensive review of corporate policies and practices. It is also more informative than 
any other business communication (Loughran & McDonald, 2014). Consequently, this paper 
examines the impact of cautionary language in 10-K reports (henceforth bidder conservatism) 
on subsequent M&A decisions.
3
 
Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012) argue that, consistent with the notion of the 
endogenous matching of managers with firms’ mechanisms, firms choose managers with 
characteristics that fit their own beliefs and behaviours. They find that CEOs who are more 
conservative in terms of their personal leverage are optimal at managing firms with more 
conservative debt policies.
 
They further observe that a firm may even replace a CEO with 
another who has the same attributes and behaviours. Accordingly, examining the information 
content of the 10-K provides a strong understanding of board, manager and firm-matched 
traits and their implications for future investment decisions. In view of the nature of M&A 
deals, which require intense board-manager discussions in the bid for final approval (Levi & 
Zhang, 2014), such deals constitute an ideal platform on which to test the ex-ante impact of 
bidder conservatism on M&A investment decisions. These M&A investment decisions 
include the likelihood of making an acquisition, the type and size of acquisitions (public vs. 
non-public, within-industry vs. cross-industry targets), the payment method, and how the 
market perceives those investment decisions. 
Behavioural consistency theory states that the behaviour of an individual in one 
situation could forecast his/her future behaviours in other situations (Funder & Colvin, 1991). 
Motivated by this theory, we posit that managers who convey a conservative tone in their 10-
K filings can be expected to later make conservative corporate decisions. Conservative 
                                                          
3
 We focus on the negative tone of firms’ 10-K filings, since our main independent variable is bidder 
conservatism, which is proxied by the ratio of negative words to total words, as in Ferris et al. (2013).  
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behaviour is defined as opposition to change and a tendency toward risk aversion (Wilson, 
2013). On the other hand, M&As are viewed as risky investments due to the uncertainty 
associated with forecasting their outcomes (Levi & Zhang, 2014).
4
 Thus, we expect that 
bidders with a prior conservative tone will be less likely to engage in M&A activities. 
Further, bidders might have better access to the information needed to estimate the real value 
of public targets than that required for non-public targets (Capron & Shen, 2007). 
Consequently, we posit that conservative bidders will want to avoid the uncertainty and 
asymmetry of information related to acquiring non-public targets. Similarly, we expect that 
conservative bidders will prefer to acquire familiar and same-industry targets rather than 
risky, industrially-diversified acquisitions.
5
 Eckbo (2009) documents that bidders prefer stock 
financing if there is more uncertainty about the target. Consequently, we conjecture that 
conservative bidders are likely to engage in stock acquisition deals. Prior literature (i.e., 
Tetlock, 2007; Ferris et al., 2013; Loughran & McDonald, 2011) documents that the market 
reacts negatively to a conservative tone in different business communications. Accordingly, 
we expect that conservative bidders will experience negative market reactions around the 
announcements of M&A deals.  
Based on 39,260 firm-year observations over the period between January 1996 and 
December 2013, we find significant evidence that firms with a more negative tone in their 
prior 10-Ks are less likely to be involved in subsequent acquisitions and have a small portion 
of M&A investments. This confirms our conjecture that conservative behaviour is related to 
risk-averse attitudes and a lower tendency to invest in risky investments such as M&As. We 
further find that, conditional on the making of acquisitions, conservative bidders are more 
                                                          
4
 Potential outcomes of M&As might be positive, negative or even losses that exceed the initial investment 
value (Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2014). For instance, Microsoft Corporation experienced a loss 
of $12.6 billion in their market value after announcing they had acquired Nokia’s mobile phone business for 
$7.2 billion (Amihud, DeLong, & Golubov, 2013). 
5
 Berger and Ofek (1995) report that, in 1995, multiple-segment firms with valuation discounts experienced total 
value losses of $800 billion. This issue is known as a diversification discount problem. 
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willing to acquire public targets. This might be due to information asymmetry between public 
and non-public firms (Capron & Shen, 2007). In addition, these firms prefer to pursue within-
industry acquisitions. This finding is consistent with the proposition that corporate 
conservatism is more inclined towards familiar and safe than unfamiliar stimuli (Glasgow, 
Cartier, & Wilson, 1985). Our results also indicate that conservative bidders prefer stock 
acquisitions over cash acquisitions. Finally, we find that these firms experience a negative 
market reaction after engaging in these kinds of investments. This supports the notion that the 
sentiment of qualitative corporate reports drives market trading (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2008; 
Engelberg & Parsons, 2011).  
Our paper contributes to the area of the information content and value relevance of 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)-mandated filings, the 10-K. To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous study has explored the link between the sentiment of corporate 
disclosure and subsequent corporate investment decisions in the context of M&As. We 
provide novel evidence that cautionary language plays a significant role in predicting the 
likelihood of a firm making an acquisition, and its value. These findings support the prior 
premises that conservative behaviour is associated with risk aversion and preserving the 
status quo. Similarly, we add to the literature by showing that the textual analysis of 10-Ks 
provides significant predictive power for not only the likelihood, but also the type and size, of 
subsequent acquisitions. These findings confirm the ability of the non-financial information 
revealed in the narrative sections of 10-Ks to forecast managers’ decisions regarding M&As. 
They also add to the emerging evidence on the usefulness of SEC filings, including 10-Ks 
(Loughran & McDonald, 2011, 2014, 2015a). 
We contribute to a growing literature that uses text analysis in finance, by 
investigating the implications of bidders’ pre-textual sentiment for the anticipation of sources 
of finance in M&A deals. We observe that bidders that use a conservative tone in their 
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corporate disclosure also have conservative financing policies. Our findings provide new 
evidence to support the proposition of behavioural consistency theory that individuals behave 
in a consistent way across different situations (Funder & Colvin, 1991). Further, this paper 
provides novel evidence on the interdependence between corporate disclosure and 
shareholders’ wealth. We find evidence that soft information embedded in the descriptive 
sections of the 10-Ks plays a significant role in how the market evaluates firms’ stock returns 
after they have engaged in M&A events. Collectively, these results confirm that a 
conservative tone in bidders’ 10-Ks conveys information that is economically relevant to the 
prediction of corporate M&A decisions. 
Our findings have several implications for both theory and practice in the area of 
corporate disclosure and behavioural finance. First, with regard to theory, our results provide 
some insights on the implications of bidders’ sentiment and attitude for future M&A 
investment choices. Our findings reveal that investors and stakeholders might not be able to 
fully grasp corporate policies and decisions unless they carefully analyse the sentiment of the 
narrative sections of the 10-K. This suggests the interesting possibility that major corporate 
investment decisions are derived from more than traditional economic trade-offs and 
incentives. It also confirms that the textual sentiment of the 10-K enables us to gain an in-
depth understanding of firms’ conditions, private information, managers’ incentives, and 
expected behaviours by seeing the world through their eyes. Besides this, managers should 
comprehend the mechanism through which their corporate communications influence their 
firms’ value and shareholders’ wealth. They should assess their prior negative disclosure tone 
before engaging in M&A deals, since it will have a significant effect on how the market will 
perceive the deals. Second, for practice, our findings present new insights for policy makers, 
showing the incremental valuation-relevance of SEC filings and mandatory disclosures, since 
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the textual sentiment of the 10-K could be used to predict corporate investment actions and 
their consequences.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our main 
hypotheses. Section 3 explains our methodology and empirical models. Section 4 introduces 
our empirical results. Section 5 reports some robustness checks. Section 6 presents our main 
conclusions.  
2. Hypothesis development 
2.1. Bidder conservatism and the likelihood of making an acquisition 
Behavioural consistency theory advocates the notion that individuals behave in a 
consistent way across different situations (Funder & Colvin, 1991). Empirically, Cronqvist et 
al. (2012) show that managers exhibit consistent behaviour in their personal and corporate 
leverage policies. Motivated by this theory, we conjecture that bidders that use a conservative 
tone in their corporate disclosure can be expected to make conservative investment decisions. 
Conservative behaviour is also associated with a high tendency for uncertainty avoidance and 
preserving the status quo (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). According to 
Schneider and Lopes (1986), individuals can be classified according to their attitude towards 
risk, into the risk-averse and the risk-seekers. The risk-averse group is driven by a desire for 
security or avoiding negative outcomes, while the risk-seekers group is driven by a desire for 
high returns. In a survey of a sample of 761 individuals, Kam and Simas (2010) observe that 
individuals with highly risk-averse attitudes have a greater preference for policies with 
certain outcomes than do individuals with high risk tolerance. 
On the other hand, M&A deals are risky investments, since it is hard to predict their 
outcomes due to their uniqueness, scope, size, value and other factors that will affect the 
bidders’ overall performance (Levi & Zhang, 2014). Bidders might thus experience positive 
outcomes, negative outcomes, or even losses that exceed the initial value of the M&A deal 
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(Christensen et al., 2014). For instance, Rakuten experienced a drop of $2 billion in stock 
value that exceeded the original $900 million acquisition value of the Viber internet 
messaging corporation (Yasu & Mukai, 2014). Therefore, motivated by behavioural 
consistency theory, we expect firms that convey a conservative tone in their 10-Ks are 
unlikely to be involved in subsequent M&A deals. This discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1. There is a negative relationship between bidder conservatism and the likelihood of 
making an acquisition.  
2.2 Bidder conservatism and type of acquisition 
In the previous section we proposed that conservative bidders might prefer their 
current status quo and would therefore make fewer M&A transactions. In this section, we 
review the literature to find out, in the case of conservative bidders that do decide to make 
M&A deals, which type of M&A they might prefer.  
The first aspect of acquisition type is whether the acquired firm is a public or a non-
public firm. According to Jost et al. (2003), conservative individuals exhibit a strong 
disposition towards preserving the status quo and avoiding uncertainty. They also prefer safe 
and traditional forms of organisation (Wilson, 2013). Conservative bidders’ choice between 
public and non-public targets could be explained by the difference in information availability 
for those types of target. Officer (2007, p.573) states, “While information asymmetry is 
endemic to all mergers or acquisitions, this problem is likely to be most severe ... [for 
unlisted targets], in which standards for information disclosure are not as high as for 
publicly traded firms and information about subsidiaries may be obscured by the parent’s 
financial reporting choices”. Thus, managers of non-public firms typically have better 
control over the information they want to communicate (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008). The 
relaxed disclosure requirements for non-public firms increase the uncertainty about their 
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value relative to public firms (Officer, Poulsen, & Stegemoller, 2009). In contrast, public 
firms are already priced by the markets and are subject to mandatory disclosure requirements 
and analysts’ coverage (Capron & Shen, 2007). Thus, we presume that a US-quoted 
conservative bidder might acquire public targets to avoid the increased uncertainty and 
asymmetric information associated with acquiring non-public targets.
6
 This discussion leads 
to the following hypothesis:  
H2. There is a positive relationship between bidder conservatism and the likelihood of 
making a public acquisition.  
The second aspect of acquisition type is whether the target comes from the same 
industry as the bidder or from a different one. If the target firm operates outside the bidder’s 
industrial segment, the acquisition deal is viewed as an industrially diversified acquisition 
(Duchin, 2010). Previous studies (i.e., Lang & Stulz, 1994; Lins & Servaes, 1999; Lamont & 
Polk, 2001) document the negative influence of diversified acquisitions on firms’ value. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) find that, during 1986-1991, US conglomerate firms operating in 
multiple business segments are priced at a mean discount of about 13% to 15% below the 
sum of the imputed values of their segments. This is known as the diversification discount. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) observe that bidders that acquire targets from a different 
industry experience negative returns. According to Wilson (2013), a conservative attitude is 
viewed as opposition to change and a tendency toward risk aversion. Glasgow et al. (1985) 
note that a conservative person is more inclined toward familiar and safe stimuli than 
                                                          
6
 This conjecture does not contradict previous empirical evidence (e.g., Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; 
Ang & Kohers, 2001; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004) that, unlike public acquisitions, non-public 
acquisitions achieve significant gains around bid announcements and thus could be viewed as less risky 
investments. Ekkayokkaya, Holmes, and Paudyal (2009) find the superior gains from non-public acquisitions in 
the short run to be attributable to a lack of information about their value. They also show that those non-public 
deals suffer a subsequent drop in stock returns in the long run, while the returns on public acquisitions break 
even over periods of up to three years. These findings support the view that limited information at bid 
announcements leads the market to overestimate the value effects of non-public acquisitions. However, in the 
long run, when better-quality information becomes available, the market corrects for its initial overestimation 
and values non-public acquisition deals downwards. In unreported tables, we run an event study after making a 
distinction between a short window (3 days around the announcement date) and long windows (12, 24, 36, 48, 
and 60 months), similarly to Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), and obtain consistent results. 
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unfamiliar stimuli. They have greater sensitivity to the possibility of loss and are more 
cautious about making major changes (Jost et al., 2003). Consequently, we expect that 
conservative bidders would prefer to acquire familiar and same-industry targets rather than 
industrially diversified ones. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3. There is a negative relationship between bidder conservatism and the likelihood of 
making an industrially diversified acquisition.  
2.3. Bidder conservatism and M&A payment method 
Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) observe that debt issuance is the main way of 
raising the cash required to pursue M&A deals. Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2014) find that 
managers who adopt conservative ideologies are more likely to take more conservative 
financial decisions, such as lower leverage ratios. Motivated by behavioural consistency 
theory, we presume that bidders that use cautionary language in their 10-Ks are likely to 
maintain a conservative debt level. Thus, they are likely to finance their acquisitions using 
their own stock. In addition, Martin (1996) shows that stock acquisition is preferable when 
the acquiring firm considers the target a risky investment. According to our previous 
assumptions, a conservative bidder might view M&A deals as risky investment decisions due 
to the increased variance in their expected outcomes (Christensen et al., 2014). Collectively, 
conservative bidders might have conservative debt policies and consider M&A transactions 
unsafe investments. Thus, we expect that conservative bidders are likely to rely more on their 
own equity to finance M&A deals. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4. There is a positive relationship between bidder conservatism and the likelihood of 
making a stock acquisition deal.  
2.4. Bidder conservatism and market reaction 
Previous studies (e.g., Baker & Wurgler, 2006; Tetlock et al., 2008) find that soft 
information embedded in corporate disclosure has a superior impact on the market’s 
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evaluation of firms’ stock returns than quantitative measures of firms’ fundamentals. Tetlock 
(2007) finds that the proportion of negative words of firm-specific news significantly 
explains the movement in the stock market. Ferris et al. (2013) show that the market reacts 
negatively to IPO prospectuses when the tone of the issuer is conservative. Arnold et al. 
(2010) quantify the words used in the risk factors section of the IPO prospectus and find that 
they explain most of the initial and subsequent stock returns. Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
find that a conservative tone in 10-K filings has a negative effect on firms’ stock returns 
around the filing dates. These studies confirm that firms’ stock market prices efficiently 
incorporate the linguistic information disclosed in corporate reporting. They also show that 
firms that convey a conservative tone experience poor market reactions. Thus, we expect that 
the market will react negatively to announcements of M&A transactions by conservative 
bidders. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5. There is a negative relationship between bidder conservatism and market reactions 
around the announcements of M&A deals.  
3. Methodology  
3.1. Sample  
We collect annual 10-K filings of US publicly traded firms from the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database maintained by the SEC. 10-K filings 
have a similar basic structure across most firms, as regulated by the SEC. Thus, we exclude 
amended filings from our sample (Balvers, Gaski, & McDonald, 2015).
7
 We further eliminate 
HTML, encoded images, and tables from each 10-K file, since we are interested in the 
narrative sections of these reports (Loughran & McDonald, 2014). From May 1996 onwards, 
                                                          
7
 Following Loughran and McDonald (2014), if the 10-K is not available, we use some other type of 10-K such 
as the 10-K405, 10-KSB, or 10-KSB405. These types represent 9% of our sample. A 10-K405 filing is similar 
to the 10-K except that it indicates that the CEO did not disclose insider trading activities in time. This form was 
abolished at the end of 2002. A 10-KSB is an annual report filing designed for small firms and was abolished at 
the end of March 2009. A 10-KSB405 is a 10-K405 for small US firms and was abolished at the end of 2002. 
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all US public firms have been required by the SEC to disclose 10-K reports electronically.
8
 
Our main independent variables are measured in the fiscal year preceding the announcements 
of M&A deals. Thus, our 10-K sample covers the period between January 1996 and 
December 2013.  
We then link the 10-K documents with the Compustat and CRSP databases using a 
variety of identifiers, including the Central Index Key (CIK) number associated with each 
filing, the Compustat GVKEY and the CRSP PERMNO.
9
 This merging reduces the original 
sample of 10-Ks from 67,681 to 46,410 observations during our sample period. We eliminate 
financial firms (SIC 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4999) from the sample, since words 
such as risk and causality that have negative connotations for non-financial firms might not 
be perceived in the same way for financial firms (Jegadeesh & Wu, 2013). Additionally, 
these firms are subject to regulatory constraints and different accounting considerations 
(Uysal, 2011). We omit firm-year observations with missing data for any variable that we use 
in our empirical models during the sample period. The above steps lead to a sample of 39,260 
firm-year observations.
10
 
From the Thomson One database, we download M&A data for non-financial US 
public acquirers for the period between 1st January 1997 and 31st December 2014. Following 
Uysal (2011) and Karampatsas, Petmezas, and Travlos (2014), to be included in our sample a 
target may be a public, a private or a subsidiary firm. Acquisition deals should be completed 
and may be either domestic or foreign. The payment method has to be cash, stock, or a 
                                                          
8
 Electronic filings of 10-Ks were phased in over a three-year period prior to being made compulsory in May 
1996. Thus, 10-K filings during those three years were biased toward large firms. We obtain the same results 
when we start our sample in 1993. 
 
9
 We thank Bill McDonald for affording us access to his data file so that we could create a list of CIK numbers 
and filing dates for our sample of 10-K reports.  
 
10
 Loughran and McDonald (2014) keep only those 10-K filings with at least 2,000 words. Lehavy, Li, and 
Merkley (2011) eliminate filings with fewer than 3,000 words to minimise errors arising from filing 
transmission or incomplete filing. It is notable that excluding those files from our sample does not affect the 
results. 
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combination of both. The acquisition deal represents at least 50% of the target. We exclude 
all transactions labelled as minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, 
privatisations, leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalisations, self-tenders or exchange offers, 
and repurchases (Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, & Travlos, 2013). We employ, as a cut-off 
point, a minimum deal value of $1 million in order to avoid obtaining results generated by 
very small targets (Uysal, 2011). 
3.2. Bidder’s conservative tone 
Following Ferris et al. (2013), we measure conservative tone as the number of 
negative words divided by the total number of words in the narrative sections of the 10-K 
filings, multiplied by 100. We employ Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) negative word list, 
since it is more relevant in a business communication context than other lists (e.g., Harvard’s 
General Inquirer (GI); Diction; Henry, 2008). The Harvard GI and Diction’s negative word 
lists are drawn from a broader social science context and thus some of their entries might not 
have negative connotations in business disclosure (Kearney & Liu, 2014). Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) report that almost 75% of the Harvard GI’s negative words are 
inappropriate for capturing a negative tone in business applications. Harvard words such as 
“tax, cost, capital, board, and depreciation” do not have a negative meaning when used in 
10-K reports (Kearney & Liu, 2014). Diction has 920 pessimistic words that can be obtained 
by combining the three subcategories of blame, hardship, and denial. Using a sample of 
77,158 10-Ks, Loughran and McDonald (2015b) report that 70% of Diction’s negative words 
are misclassified and do not generally indicate a pessimistic tone. For instance, the word 
“vice” is one of Diction’s negative words that does not have the same negative effect in 
regard to corporate textual information (Ferris et al., 2013). Henry (2008) introduces a 
negative list that contains 85 words developed from corporate earnings press releases. The 
main drawback is the limited number of words included in this list, which means that it 
14 
 
misses important negative words such as “loss, losses, adverse and impairment” (Loughran & 
McDonald, 2015b). Consequently, we use Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) comprehensive 
negative word list extracted from a large sample of 10-K reports and created specifically for 
analysing corporate documents.  
We also employ a negative word list only, and not a positive one, since we are 
interested in evaluating the issue of bidder's conservatism. Furthermore, negative words are 
clearer than positive words. Managers will rarely negate negative words in order to deliver a 
positive statement. Conversely, many positive words may be employed to make a negative 
statement (Loughran & McDonald, 2011). Tetlock et al. (2008), Loughran and McDonald 
(2015a), and Garcia (2013) clarify that a negative word list provides more incremental 
information and has significantly better explanatory power than a positive list. Loughran and 
McDonald’s (2011) negative list contains 2,329 words commonly used by company 
managers. Several studies confirm that this negative word list is appropriate for gauging tone 
in different business contexts, for instance, for analysing the sentiment of the MD&A section 
of the 10-K report (Feldman et al., 2010), analyst reports (Huang, Zang, & Zheng, 2014), 
earnings conference calls (Matsumoto, Pronk, & Roelofsen, 2011), and the IPO prospectus 
(Ferris et al., 2013; Loughran & McDonald, 2013).  
Our measure of bidder conservatism using the ratio of negative words to total words 
has several advantages over a manual scoring of the 10-K documents. It avoids potential 
misinterpretations or inconsistencies that are associated with a subjective categorisation of 
10-Ks (Li, 2010). It is a continuous variable that improves the power of our empirical tests in 
comparison to the subjective dummy variables used in prior literature (e.g., Christensen et al., 
2014; Hutton et al., 2014). It is also divided by the total number of words in the 10-K, which 
enables comparisons to be made between 10-Ks of different lengths. It is objective and could 
easily be replicated for large quantities of corporate disclosures, through the power of 
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computer analysis (Rogers, Buskirk, & Zechman, 2011). In contrast, manual content analysis 
has a small sample size that affects the power of the analysis and the generalisability of the 
results (Li, 2010).  
Further, our word-list methodology might be better than a complicated technique such 
as the naïve Bayesian algorithm. The naïve Bayesian methodology is always viewed as a 
“black box procedure”, since little is known about the rules and filters used to analyse the 
contexts of documents (Loughran & McDonald, 2015a). Usually, a small sample of 
documents is used to train the program. Then, the naïve Bayesian algorithm starts to classify 
the tone of the documents according to unseen classification filters (Buehlmaier & Whited, 
2014; Antweiler & Frank, 2004). We cannot tell which sentences are classified as positive, 
negative and neutral, or which phrases or words dominate the analysis (Loughran & 
McDonald, 2015a). In some cases, texts are manually coded by non-native speakers (see Li, 
2010; Huang et al., 2014). Thus, it is hard to replicate the results or test their reliability. 
Finally, the naïve Bayesian methodology is more time consuming and costly than the word-
list approach (Kearney & Liu, 2014).  
3.3. Empirical models 
We use the estimated prior conservatism of the bidder to investigate its impact on the 
subsequent M&A investment decisions and economic consequences. First, we combine M&A 
data with all US public firms from 1996 to 2013 to create a variable that represents the 
likelihood of a firm undertaking an acquisition. Then, we employ the following probit model 
to test H1, which addresses the effect of bidder conservatism on the likelihood of pursuing an 
acquisition: 
P (Acquisition=1) = Φ (β 0 + β1 Bidder conservatism i,t-1  + ∑ βi Controls i,t-1)  (1) 
Here, Acquisition is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm makes an 
acquisition and zero otherwise. Bidder conservatism is the negative word count scaled by the 
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total number of words in the 10-K with a filing date preceding the announcement date of an 
acquisition. To control for firm characteristics, we include several variables based on prior 
literature. Uysal (2011) finds that firms with higher profitability ratios have a greater ability 
to acquire other firms. The profitability ratio is measured as earnings before interest, tax and 
depreciation (EBITD) divided by total assets, at the fiscal year-end preceding the acquisition 
(Harford, 1999). Uysal (2011) shows that firms with high leverage ratios are less likely to 
make acquisitions. The firms’ market leverage equals total debt divided by the sum of total 
debt plus the market value of equity (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). Large firms are more 
likely to make acquisitions than smaller firms (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Bidder size is 
defined as the natural logarithm of sales (Almazan, De Motta, Titman, & Uysal, 2010). Firms 
with higher market-to-book (MTB) ratios and stock returns have high likelihoods of 
acquiring other firms in order to reap the benefits of overvaluation (Uysal, 2011). We use the 
stock return ratio and the MTB ratio at the fiscal year-end preceding the acquisition 
announcement date to control for the potential confounding impact of these variables.  
To control for industry characteristics, following Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling 
(2002), we employ an industry M&A liquidity index to account for corporate asset liquidity 
in each industry. We define the industry M&A liquidity index as the total acquisition value, 
for each year and three-digit SIC code, divided by the total assets of all Compustat ﬁrms from 
the same three-digit SIC code and year. Further, Uysal (2011) finds a negative relationship 
between industry concentration and the likelihood of acquisitions. Industry concentration is 
measured by the Herfindahl index, which equals the sum of the squares of sales of a firm 
divided by the sum of sales of all ﬁrms sharing the same three-digit SIC code (Hou & 
Robinson, 2006). We include industry dummies based on Fama and French’s 12-industry 
classification to account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in industry 
characteristics. We use year-fixed effects in the regression model to control for unobserved 
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effects over time. We employ random-effects models to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
that might be correlated with the likelihood of making an acquisition.11
 
 
As a further check, we construct another dependent variable that equals the sum of the 
acquisition value divided by total assets, to address the same relationship as is proposed in 
H1. Then, we regress this variable on the prior conservatism of the bidder and the same 
control variables as in model (1) using the random-effects Tobit model, since the dependent 
variable is censored at zero. We do not use Tobit fixed-effects models because the maximum 
estimates of these models are biased and Tobit models are non-linear models. Moreover, it is 
difficult to cluster the standard error in the presence of censored data. Thus, in all the 
estimations, the robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level, except in the random-
effects Tobit models where we use bootstrapping. Bootstrapping is a non-parametric 
randomisation technique that draws N clusters of observations from firm clusters rather than 
individual firm-year observations. In our Tobit models we employ 500 bootstrap datasets to 
estimate standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity, correlation, and autocorrelation 
(Efron, 1979). 
Next, for those firms that have engaged in acquisition transactions, we test H2 and 
H3, which explore the impact of bidder conservatism on target type. We adopt the following 
probit models to address these issues: 
P (Public acquisition=1) = Φ (β 0 + β1 Bidder conservatism i,t-1 + ∑ βi Controls i,t-1 )  (2) 
P (DIV2SIC= 1)             = Φ (β 0 + β1 Bidder conservatism i,t-1 + ∑ βi Controls i,t-1 )  (3) 
The dependent variable in model (2) takes the value one if a firm acquires a public 
target and zero if it acquires a non-public target. In model (3), the dependent variable 
DIV2SIC is an industrially diversified acquisition dummy that takes the value one if the 
                                                          
11
 Due to the small amount of within-firm variation in M&A activity levels, using logit fixed-effects models 
would exclude more than 50% of our sample observations. In unreported tables, we employ firm-fixed-effects 
models and standard models and obtain consistent results.  
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bidder’s two-digit SIC code differs from that of the target and zero otherwise (Karampatsas et 
al., 2014). We further employ a Tobit analysis using the ratio of the acquisition value of each 
type to the bidders’ total assets, since the dependent variable is censored at zero. 
We also explore the impact of the conservative ratio on bidders’ choice between stock 
and cash acquisitions. Following Karampatsas et al. (2014), we construct a dependent 
variable that takes the value one if the deal is financed with more than 50% stock and zero if 
it is financed with more than 50% cash. We use the following probit model to address H4:  
P (Stock dominated=1) = Φ (β0 + β 1 Bidder conservatism i,t-1 + ∑ βi Controls i,t-1)   (4) 
We also examine the impact of bidder conservatism on the market reaction to the 
announcement of acquisition deals. We estimate CARs (cumulative abnormal returns) over a 
three-day event window (one day before and one day after the announcement date) using a 
market model. We use two benchmark returns, namely, an equally weighted and a value-
weighted index of returns. Then, we use these CARs to run the following fixed-effects 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to test H5:
12
 
      CAR i,t = β0 + β 1 Bidder conservatism i,t-1 + ∑ βi Controls i,t-1  + Ɛ i,t  (5) 
Finally, we run all the above models again after replacing the bidder conservatism 
variable with a highly conservative variable that takes the value one if the conservatism ratio 
of the bidder is higher than the sample median and zero otherwise. We do so in order to test 
whether the potential impact of the bidder conservatism ratio highlighted in the previous 
research questions is identical for highly conservative and less conservative firms.  
                                                          
12
 We run fixed-effects OLS to control for endogeneity problems resulting from unobserved heterogeneity of a 
firm-specific and/or time-invariant nature. In unreported tables, estimating standard OLS and random-effects 
OLS regressions yields qualitatively similar results.  
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4. Empirical findings 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in 
our analysis, as described in the previous section and to be discussed in the following 
sections. The panel shows that 25.3% (9946= 0.253×39260) of US firms, over the sample 
period of 18 years, make acquisitions, among which 18% (82%) are public (non-public) 
acquisitions. Around 40% (60%) are industrially diversified (focused) acquisitions. Over the 
period of the study, on average 24% (76%) of the US firms funded their acquisitions in a 
stock-dominated (cash-dominated) manner. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the main statistics for the explanatory variables used in our 
analysis. These descriptive statistics are calculated from a sample of 39,260 firm-year 
observations. We find that, over the sample period, US non-financial firms’ bidder 
conservatism is on average 1.630, implying the number of negative words relative to total 
words revealed in the 10-K is 1.63%. The bidder conservatism variable ranges from 0.575 to 
2.740, on average, suggesting significant variation in firms’ conservative tone over the period 
of our study. Such variation is further confirmed in Panel C of Table 1, which presents the 
differences in means for our independent variables, according to whether a firm makes an 
acquisition. The difference-in-means is tested using the parametric t-statistics. We find that 
29,314 firms decide not to make an acquisition, while 9,946 firms make an acquisition during 
the sample period.  
Panel C reports the mean conservative tone for non-acquiring firms as 1.635, while 
that for acquiring firms is 1.607. The observed difference in conservative tone between non-
acquiring and acquiring firms is significant at the 1% level based on a t-test (t= + 4.995), 
lending preliminary support for our first hypothesis that firms with a more conservative tone 
would be likely to acquire fewer targets. Panel C reveals that the mean values of market 
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leverage and the Herfindahl index for non-acquiring firms are significantly greater than those 
for acquiring firms. In contrast, the mean values of other variables, including profitability, 
bidder size, MTB, stock return, and industry liquidity, for the non-acquiring group are 
significantly lower than the mean values for the acquiring group.  
Panel D reports the differences between highly conservative and less conservative 
firms in terms of the means and medians of key variables used in our analysis. It reveals that 
there are significant differences between highly and less conservative firms regarding their 
profitability, bidder size, stock return, Herfindahl index, and industry liquidity, at the 1% 
level, based on a t-test. Our results also show that highly conservative firms have 
significantly lower levels of market leverage (conservative debt levels) and lower levels of 
MTB than less conservative firms. Our results suggest that highly conservative firms acquire 
significantly smaller targets (sum of acquisition/TA) than less conservative firms. 
Accordingly, highly conservative firms might be interested in acquiring these relatively 
smaller targets so as to manage their risk levels. 
[Insert Table 1] 
4.2. Testing H1: Does bidder conservatism influence the likelihood of making an 
acquisition?  
This section investigates whether bidder conservatism affects a firm’s decision to 
make an acquisition. To address this question, we undertake a probit analysis using a dataset 
of 39,260 firm-year observations. We also run a Tobit model to test whether bidder 
conservatism affects the size of an acquisition. Table 2 reports the empirical results for the 
impact of bidder conservatism on the probability of pursuing an acquisition.  
 [Insert Table 2] 
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates of the probit models in columns 1 and 2 and 
of the Tobit models in columns 3 and 4. We find that bidder conservatism has a negative 
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association with both the likelihood of engaging in an acquisition and the size of this 
acquisition as reported in columns 1 and 3, respectively. These findings support the premise 
of the behavioural consistency theory, which states that firms conveying a conservative tone 
in their corporate annual reporting will exhibit the same behaviour in implementing 
conservative corporate investment policies. Table 2 reports the average marginal effects to 
assess the economic significance of the bidder conservatism variable. Given that the average 
marginal effects of bidder conservatism is -0.021 and its standard deviation is 0.442, a one-
standard deviation increase in the bidder conservatism variable is related to a -3.67% (= -
0.021×0.442/ acquisition dummy sample mean of 0.253) decline in the likelihood of making 
an acquisition. These findings imply that bidder conservatism seems to have a reasonable 
economic impact on the likelihood of M&A investments. Our results are also robust to 
controlling for firm characteristics, industry characteristics, year-fixed effects and 
unobserved heterogeneity; this provides evidence in support of H1 in that the disclosure tone 
of 10-K filings could predict firms’ subsequent M&A investment decisions.13 
Further, we examine the impact of bidder conservatism on the probability of making 
acquisitions after splitting the effect of highly conservative firms from that of less 
conservative firms. Column 2 of Table 2 shows that highly conservative firms are less likely 
to make acquisitions. The marginal effects of the variable for highly conservative firms show 
that it has a non-trivial economic impact. This shows that moving from a less conservative 
position to a highly conservative one (the change from 0 to 1) reduces the likelihood of an 
acquisition by 0.013, a decrease of 5% (0.013/ acquisition dummy sample mean of 0.253) 
over the sample average. Consistent with the lower likelihood of acquisitions, column 4 
indicates that highly conservative firms invest less in acquisition transactions than do less 
conservative firms. 
                                                          
13
 In unreported analysis, we run standard models and fixed-effects logit models and obtain similar results. 
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For the other control variables, consistent with Uysal (2011), firms with high 
leverage ratios are less able to acquire other firms. We find that more profitable firms are 
more able to make acquisitions. The significant sign of firms’ size at the 1% level reveals 
that bigger firms have a higher probability of acquiring targets than smaller firms. We show 
that the stock return and the MTB both have significantly positive impacts on the bidder’s 
decision to make an acquisition. 
4.3. Testing H2: Does bidder conservatism influence the likelihood of acquiring a public 
target?  
This section examines how a conservative tone affects a firm’s decision regarding 
acquisition type, specifically in terms of public versus non-public acquisitions. Column 1 of 
Table 3 shows that bidder conservatism has a positive association with the likelihood of 
undertaking public acquisitions relative to non-public acquisitions. The marginal effects and 
the standard deviation of the bidder conservatism variable are 0.026 and 0.442, respectively. 
This indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in the bidder conservatism variable is 
associated with a 6% (0.026× 0.442/ public dummy sample mean of 0.180) larger likelihood 
of acquiring a public target. These results show that bidder conservatism itself is an 
economically significant driver of firms’ decision over whether to acquire public targets. 
Further, our findings are in line with the assumption that conservative bidders exhibit greater 
aversion to ambiguity and uncertainty related to the value of a target. Thus, they prefer public 
acquisitions in order to avoid the uncertainty and asymmetry of the information associated 
with non-public acquisitions (Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009). Overall, we accept H2 that there is a 
positive relationship between a bidder’s conservative tone and their likelihood of making a 
public acquisition.  
[Insert Table 3] 
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Next, we test whether the positive relationship between bidder conservatism and the 
likelihood of acquiring a public target is identical for both highly and less conservative firms. 
Column 2 of Table 3 reports that highly conservative firms have a higher tendency to acquire 
public targets than non-public targets. They also invest in public acquisitions more often than 
less conservative firms, as reported in column 4. Further, the marginal effects confirm the 
economic impact of the variable for highly conservative firms. Specifically, column 2 reports 
that moving from a less conservative position to a highly conservative one (the change from 0 
to 1) increases the likelihood of acquiring a public target by 0.019.  
4.4. Testing H3: Does a bidder’s conservatism influence its likelihood of making an 
industrially diversified acquisition?  
This section investigates the relationship between bidder conservatism and firms’ 
acquisition types, in particular, the likelihood of acquiring industrially diverse versus same-
industry targets. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that bidder conservatism reduces the likelihood 
of making industrially diversified acquisitions. The marginal effects of the bidder 
conservatism variable indicate that this relation is not only statistically significant, but also 
economically significant. It suggests that a one-standard deviation increase in bidder 
conservatism reduces the likelihood of a firm making diversifying acquisitions by 4% (-0.040 
×0.442/ DIV2SIC sample mean of 0.40). This finding is consistent with the conjuncture that 
conservative firms are more inclined towards familiar and safe than unfamiliar stimuli. 
Targets from different industries are viewed as unfamiliar stimuli compared to within-
industry acquisitions. Column 3 of Table 4 shows that conservative bidders invest less in 
industrially diversified acquisitions than in focused acquisitions. This confirms Jost et al.’s 
(2003) view that conservative individuals have a strong resistance to change. Accordingly, 
we accept H3 that conservative bidders prefer focused acquisitions than acquiring targets 
from industries outside of their own.  
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[Insert Table 4] 
Next, we address whether the effect of bidder conservatism on the probability of 
undertaking industrially diversified acquisitions is systematic for highly versus less 
conservative firms. Column 2 of Table 4 shows highly conservative firms are less likely to 
acquire targets from other industries. They also invest less in industrially diversified 
acquisitions than do less conservative firms, as reported in column 4. The marginal effects of 
the highly conservative variable also confirm the economic significance of our results.   
4.5. Testing H4: Does bidder conservatism influence the M&A payment method?  
This section examines the impact of bidder conservatism on the financing method for 
M&A deals. Table 5 indicates that bidder conservatism affects the payment method of an 
acquisition. In particular, column 1 finds that bidder conservatism increases the probability of 
using stock as a medium of payment in acquisition deals. The marginal effects in column 1 
suggest that a one-standard deviation increase in bidder conservatism variable is related to a 
4% (0.023 × 0.442 / stock dominated sample mean of 0.237) larger likelihood of making 
stock acquisitions. Similarly, column 3 shows that the bidder conservatism variable increases 
the percentage of stock in the acquisition transaction. These results are in line with the notion 
that conservative bidders use stock acquisitions in order to reduce the uncertainty associated 
with the acquisition process outcomes (Levi & Zhang, 2014). The significance of the results 
is also robust even when controlling for the bidder’s stock return and MTB ratio. This 
suggests that the impact of bidder conservatism is not derived from either the firms’ 
overpricing effect, or the impact of firms’ growth opportunities. However, it confirms H4, in 
that the conservative tone of a 10-K could predict the method of payment used by a bidder in 
M&A transactions. 
[Insert Table 5] 
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Next, we test whether the effect of bidder conservatism on M&A payment methods is 
identical for both highly and less conservative firms. Column 2 shows that highly 
conservative firms prefer stock acquisitions relative to less conservative firms. Column 4 
reports that highly conservative firms use more stock than cash in their acquisition offers. 
The marginal effects of the highly conservative variable also confirm the economic 
significance of our results. 
For the other control variables, relative size has a significant positive relationship with 
the likelihood of stock financing at the 1% level. These findings are consistent with Moeller 
et al.’s (2004) argument that it is difficult to raise sufficient debt for cash offers if the 
acquisition deal size is larger than the size of the bidder. We also find that bigger firms are 
more inclined to offer cash for their targets. This relationship is significant at the 1% level. 
MTB has a positive association with the probability of using stock as a medium of payment 
for acquisition transactions. Finally, foreign acquisitions are more likely to be financed by 
cash.  
4.6. Testing H5: Does bidder conservatism influence abnormal announcement returns 
around M&A deals?  
This section investigates whether the conservative tone of prior 10-Ks affects how the 
market perceives the quality of subsequent acquisition events. Consistent with the market 
efficiency hypothesis, the market should react accurately and in a timely manner to new 
information such as acquisition announcements (Fama, 1991). Thus, we use an event study to 
investigate the immediate impact of acquisition announcements by conservative bidders on 
shareholders’ wealth. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 presents the impact of bidder conservatism on CARs to the announcements of 
M&A events. Columns 1 and 3 show that the market reacts negatively when conservative 
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bidder firms announce their M&A deals. In particular, we find that a one-standard deviation 
increase in bidder conservatism reduces the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around 
the announcement of an acquisition by approximately 0.0035 (0.008 × 0.442). These results 
confirm the economic significance of corporate disclosure and its direct impact on how 
external investors view firms’ subsequent investment decisions. Further, columns 2 and 4 
show that highly conservative firms experience more negative stock returns than less 
conservative firms. Our findings are robust to controlling for firm characteristics, industry 
characteristics, year-fixed effects, and unobserved heterogeneity, and to using different 
benchmark returns. This supports H5, that a previous conservative tone could predict the 
market reaction around subsequent acquisition transactions. It also highlights the mechanism 
through which bidder sentiment could influence shareholders’ wealth. 
For the other control variables, Table 6 shows that, consistent with Uysal (2011), 
highly leveraged firms are likely to be selective and choose the most value-enhancing 
acquisitions, and thus likely to experience a positive market reaction around M&A events. In 
line with Moeller et al. (2004) and Uysal (2011), Table 6 indicates that the market reacts 
positively to announcements of acquisitions of targets that are large relative to the acquirer. 
Further, due to the hubris effect, our results confirm Moller et al.’s (2004) view that the 
market reacts more negatively to the acquisition announcements of bigger firms than to those 
of smaller firms. Table 6 documents the market’s reaction in favour of M&A deals that are 
financed totally with cash, and the abnormally poor stock returns experienced by purely 
stock-financed acquisition deals. These findings are consistent with that of Fuller et al. 
(2002), in that cash bids usually give a positive signal to the market about the expected future 
gains from M&A deals. In contrast, the financing of an acquisition entirely with stock might 
indicate that the bidders are overvalued or the target is a risky investment (Eckbo, 2009). 
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5. Robustness checks 
The foregoing empirical findings section documents that adopting alternative 
estimation techniques provides robust results. As the previous sections showed, we use 
different proxies for our dependent variables, i.e., dummy variables, continuous variables as 
reported in Tables 2 to 5, and different market indices as reported in Table 6. We also 
estimate our main independent variable using continuous and dummy variables (reported in 
Tables 2 to 6). Further, we employ different regression models, namely probit and Tobit (see 
Tables 2 to 5) and OLS (Table 6). We adopt different coefficient estimations: random-effects 
estimations reported in Tables 2 to 5, fixed-effect estimations reported in Table 6 and 
standard estimation models, in unreported tables, and obtain similar results. We also run, in 
unreported tests, fixed-effects estimations for Table 2 and random-effects estimations for 
Table 6 and again obtain similar findings.  
5.1. Multinomial logit for M&A payment method 
As a further robustness check, we run a multinomial model in Appendix B to test the 
effect of bidder conservatism on the payment method used for acquisition transactions. We 
employ this model since our dependent variable has three different categories, namely, pure 
stock acquisitions, pure cash acquisitions, and mixed payment methods. The variable for pure 
stock acquisitions takes the value one if the whole transaction is paid for in stock and zero 
otherwise. Pure cash acquisitions takes the value one if the whole transaction is paid for in 
cash and zero otherwise. Mixed payment methods takes the value one if the transaction is 
paid for in both cash and stock and zero otherwise. We choose pure cash acquisitions as our 
reference group. Column 1 shows that bidder conservatism have a positive association with 
stock acquisitions, relative to cash acquisitions. Column 2 shows that highly conservative 
firms are more likely to use their own stocks to finance their M&A deals, relative to less 
conservative firms. Column 3 suggests that bidder conservatism is associated with larger 
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likelihood of using a mix of stock and cash, relative to financing the entire M&A deal with 
cash only. We do not observe any significant relationship for highly conservative firms in 
column 4. Overall, the estimates of this multinomial logit model confirm our previous 
findings that bidder conservatism has a positive association with the likelihood of stock 
acquisitions.  
5.2. Standardised conservatism  
Tetlock et al. (2008) use a standardised proxy of the fraction of negative words in 
each firm-specific news story to account for non-stationary negative tone. This non-
stationarity in the negative sentiment might be due to changes in regimes, coverage, or styles 
of business communication. Following Tetlock et al. (2008), we develop two proxies to 
control for non-stationarity of conservative tone in a firm’s 10-K filings. In particular, we use 
a standardised conservative words proxy and a standardised bidder conservatism proxy. We 
estimate the standardised conservative words proxy as the number of negative words in the 
firm’s 10-K minus the mean, divided by the standard deviation, where the mean and standard 
deviation are calculated at the firm level across the sample period. We similarly define 
standardised bidder conservatism as the bidder conservatism minus its mean, divided by its 
standard deviation, again at the firm level. We test the impact of our standardised proxies on 
the likelihood of making an M&A investment and the consequences of such an investment. 
Appendix C shows, consistent with our previous results, that standardised conservatism has a 
negative association with the probability of acquiring targets. Appendix D supports our 
previous finding that the market reacts negatively to M&A investments by conservative 
bidders.   
5.3. Bidder conservatism and financial crisis  
The collapse of major financial institutions during the financial crisis caused a 
dramatic fall in global credit markets. This fall led to a severe reduction in the availability of 
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external finance and impeded firms’ ability to invest (Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010). 
Grave, Vardiabasis, and Yavas (2012) find a significant decline in M&A activity during the 
global financial crisis. Accordingly, it is important to explore the possibility that the negative 
relationship between bidder conservatism and the likelihood of making an acquisition is 
driven by the financial crisis shock. We control for the financial crisis effects using three 
variables, representing the periods prior to, during and post the crisis. The financial crisis 
variable takes the value one for the years of the financial crisis, 2008 and 2009, and zero 
otherwise (Frankel & Saravelos, 2012). The dummy variable prior (post) financial crisis takes 
the value one for the years before (after) the financial crisis period, and zero otherwise. 
Appendix E shows that the expected relationship between bidder conservatism and the 
likelihood of making an acquisition still exists and is significantly robust to excluding the 
effects of the financial crisis and the period subsequent to it.  
Further, Samarakoon (2011) reports that, during the financial crisis, the US stock 
market plummeted by 43%. Thus, it is essential to test whether the negative market reaction 
around the announcements of M&A deals by conservative bidders is driven by the effect of 
the financial crisis. Appendix F shows that M&A transactions by conservative bidders still 
experience poor stock returns after we exclude the effects of the financial crisis and the 
period subsequent to it.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper provides new insights in the area of information content and the value 
relevance of one of the major SEC-mandated filings, the 10-K. The paper explores whether 
the qualitative sections of the 10-K could predict future M&A investment decisions and 
related movements in the stock market. In particular, it examines the effects of bidders’ 
conservatism or cautionary language in 10-Ks on the likelihood of making an acquisition, the 
type of the acquisition, the financing choice for the acquisition, and the market reaction 
30 
 
around the announcement of the acquisition. According to behavioural consistency theory, 
we posit that firms that convey a conservative tone in their corporate annual reporting would 
be likely to exhibit the same behaviour in conducting conservative corporate investment and 
financing policies. Consistent with this assumption, we find that conservative bidders are 
conservative in undertaking acquisitions.  
Our findings present evidence that the textual sentiment of 10-K reports influences the 
types of investment made. In particular, we find that conservative bidders prefer public 
targets, which have less information asymmetry than non-public firms. They also prefer to 
acquire familiar, that is, within-industry, targets rather than those outside their own industry. 
According to Levi and Zhang (2014), acquisition deals are risky investments due to the 
uncertainty associated with their expected outcomes. We document that conservative bidders 
are more inclined to use their stocks as the medium of financing M&A deals. These results 
are in line with the notion that conservative bidders use stock acquisition in order to reduce 
the uncertainty associated with the acquisition process. Finally, we investigate how the 
market perceives M&A investments made by conservative bidders. We find that these 
conservative firms experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement of M&A 
deals. This provides direct evidence of the mechanism through which bidder sentiment could 
influence shareholders’ wealth. Collectively, this paper is one of the first to address the 
predictive power of mandatory 10-K filings regarding subsequent M&A decisions. Our 
results have several implications for the area of corporate mandatory disclosure. For instance, 
investors should carefully analyse corporate textual sentiment in order to effectively grasp 
corporate attitudes and their potential impact on the quality of future M&A investment 
decisions.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample  
Panel A: Summary statistics of main dependent variables used in subsequent tables 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Acquisition dummy 39,260 0.253 0.000 0.428 0.000 1.000 
Sum of acquisitions/TA 39260 0.087 0.000 0.313 0.000 2.253 
Public dummy 9,946 0.180 0.000 0.384 0.000 1.000 
Sum of public acquisitions/ TA 9,946 0.108 0.000 0.399 0.000 2.810 
DIV2SIC 9,946 0.400 0.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 
Diversifying acquisitions/ TA 9,946 0.172 0.000 0.518 0.000 3.676 
Stock dominated 9,946 0.237 0.000 0.425 0.000 1.000 
% of stock 9,946 0.245 0.000 0.390 0.000 1.000 
CAR_equally index 9,701 0.008 0.005 0.048 -0.067 0.094 
CAR_value index 9,701 0.008 0.004 0.048 -0.068 0.093 
Panel B: Summary statistics of full sample 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bidder conservatism 39,260 1.630 1.632 0.442 0.575 2.740 
Market leverage 39,260 0.203 0.122 0.232 0.000 0.934 
Profitability 39,260 0.010 0.101 0.355 -2.300 0.395 
Bidder size 39,260 5.365 5.433 2.315 0.000 10.693 
MTB 39,260 3.048 2.073 5.738 -20.363 37.138 
Stock return 39,260 0.204 0.039 0.885 -0.926 5.000 
Herfindahl index 39,260 0.140 0.099 0.127 0.031 0.794 
Industry M&A liquidity 39,260 0.028 0.014 0.041 0.000 0.214 
Panel C: Difference in means between acquiring and non-acquiring firms 
Variables 
Acquiring firms Non-acquiring firms Difference 
Mean  Mean  t-value  
Bidder conservatism 1.607 1.635 -4.995*** 
Market leverage 0.148 0.218 -24.138*** 
Profitability 0.079 -0.008 19.973*** 
Bidder size 5.926 5.217 24.841*** 
MTB 3.733 2.867 12.175*** 
Stock return 0.370 0.159 19.159*** 
Herfindahl index 0.131 0.143 -7.737*** 
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Industry M&A liquidity 0.031 0.027 7.734*** 
Number of observations 9,946 29,314  
 
Panel D: Difference in means between highly and less conservative firms 
Variables 
Highly conservative firms Less conservative firms  Difference 
Mean  Mean  t-value 
Market leverage 0.196 0.209 -5.258*** 
Profitability -0.022 0.043 -18.268*** 
Bidder size 5.325 5.404 -3.407*** 
MTB 2.967 3.128 -2.770*** 
Sum of acquisitions/ TA 0.082 0.092 -3.212*** 
Stock return 0.179 0.229 -5.625*** 
Herfindahl index 0.134 0.147 -10.382*** 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.027 0.028 1.712*** 
Number of observations 19,630 19,630  
Panels A, B, C and D of this table give descriptive statistics of all variables as follows: Panel 
A reports summary statistics of the main dependent variables used in the paper. Panel B 
reports summary statistics for US public firms with 10-K SEC filings from 1996 to 2013. 
Panel C reports the t-test on the statistical significance of the difference in means between 
non-acquiring firms and acquiring firms. Panel D reports t-tests on the statistical significance 
of the difference in means between highly and less conservative firms. Panels C and D also 
show the t-values of the differences that are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*)10%, (**)5%, 
and (***)1% levels. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous variables 
are winsorised at the 1% level. 
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Table 2. Does bidder conservatism affect the probability of making an acquisition? 
 
(1) 
Acquisition 
dummy 
(2) 
Acquisition 
dummy 
(3) 
Sum of 
acquisitions/ 
TA 
(4) 
Sum of 
acquisitions/ TA 
Bidder conservatism -0.083***  -0.047***  
[Marginal effects] [-0.021]  [-0.010]  
 
(-3.17)  (-2.77)  
Highly conservative 
firms  -0.052**  -0.029** 
[Marginal effects]  [-0.013]  [-0.006] 
  (-2.40)  (-2.06) 
Market leverage -1.080*** -1.081*** -0.796*** -0.796*** 
 
(-18.60) (-18.63) (-19.84) (-19.86) 
Profitability 0.215*** 0.222*** 0.095*** 0.099*** 
 
(4.62) (4.74) (3.51) (3.64) 
Bidder size 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 
(12.83) (12.78) (5.36) (5.32) 
MTB 0.004** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(2.44) (2.45) (3.90) (3.91) 
Stock return 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
 
(9.07) (9.08) (13.54) (13.54) 
Herfindahl index -0.157 -0.164 -0.123 -0.127 
 
(-1.51) (-1.57) (-1.55) (-1.60) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.064 0.063 -0.056 -0.055 
 
(0.25) (0.25) (-0.33) (-0.33) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 39,260 39,260 39,260 39,260 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the random-effects probit analysis in columns 1 
and 2 and the random-effects Tobit analysis in columns 3 and 4. The dependent variable in 
the probit models takes the value one if the firm makes an acquisition and zero otherwise. 
The Tobit analysis estimates the ratio of the sum of the acquisition value to the firm’s total 
assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised 
at the 1% level. Marginal effects for bidder conservatism and highly conservative firms are 
reported in square brackets. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered by firm for the probit models and bootstrapped for the Tobit models. The 
estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% 
levels. 
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Table 3. Does bidder conservatism affect the probability of making public versus non-
public acquisitions? 
 
(1) 
Public 
dummy 
(2) 
Public 
dummy 
(3) 
Sum of public 
acquisitions/TA 
(4) 
Sum of public 
acquisitions/TA 
Bidder Conservatism 0.123***  0.153***  
[Marginal effects] [0.026]  [0.032]  
 
(2.59)  (3.57)  
Highly conservative firms  0.093**  0.097*** 
[Marginal effects]  [0.019]  [0.020] 
  (2.31)  (2.67) 
Market leverage -0.141 -0.142 -0.138 -0.141 
 
(-1.15) (-1.16) (-1.30) (-1.33) 
Profitability -0.381*** -0.391*** 0.074 0.056 
 
(-2.92) (-3.00) (0.66) (0.51) 
Relative size 0.398*** 0.397*** 0.567*** 0.566*** 
 
(16.57) (16.57) (32.37) (32.31) 
Bidder size 0.291*** 0.292*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 
 
(22.39) (22.43) (18.95) (18.99) 
MTB 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 
(1.01) (1.03) (1.59) (1.61) 
Stock return -0.039* -0.038 -0.017 -0.016 
 
(-1.66) (-1.62) (-0.86) (-0.81) 
Herfindahl index -0.743*** -0.739*** -0.810*** -0.809*** 
 
(-3.23) (-3.21) (-4.22) (-4.21) 
Foreign acquisition -0.126** -0.126** -0.126*** -0.126*** 
 
(-2.57) (-2.56) (-3.00) (-3.00) 
Industry M&A liquidity -1.519*** -1.513*** -1.432*** -1.427*** 
 
(-3.04) (-3.03) (-3.17) (-3.16) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,946 9,946 9,946 9,946 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the random-effects probit analysis in columns 1 
and 2 and the random-effects Tobit analysis in columns 3 and 4. The dependent variable in 
the probit models takes the value one if the firm acquires a public target and zero if it 
acquires a non-public target. Tobit analysis estimates the ratio of the sum of public 
acquisition values to the firm’s total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level. Marginal effects for bidder conservatism 
and highly conservative firms are reported in square brackets. T-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm for the probit models and 
bootstrapped for the Tobit models. The estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at 
the (*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. 
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Table 4. Does bidder conservatism affect the probability of the firm making an 
industrially diversified acquisition versus a same-industry acquisition? 
 
(1) 
DIV2SIC 
(2) 
DIV2SIC 
(3) 
Diversifying 
acquisitions/ TA 
(4) 
Diversifying 
acquisitions/ TA 
Bidder conservatism -0.105**  -0.043*  
[Marginal effects] [-0.040]  [-0.013]  
 
(-2.55)  (-1.79)  
Highly conservative firms  -0.120***  -0.062*** 
[Marginal effects]  [-0.045]  [-0.018] 
  (-3.45)  (-2.98) 
Market leverage -0.189* -0.195* -0.166*** -0.172*** 
 
(-1.72) (-1.77) (-2.91) (-3.02) 
Profitability -0.431*** -0.433*** -0.345*** -0.350*** 
 
(-4.05) (-4.06) (-5.48) (-5.59) 
Relative size -0.009 -0.009 0.317*** 0.317*** 
 
(-0.52) (-0.52) (27.25) (27.25) 
Bidder size 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 
(3.92) (3.90) (3.13) (3.09) 
MTB -0.006 -0.006 -0.003* -0.004* 
 
(-1.52) (-1.56) (-1.75) (-1.78) 
Stock return -0.024 -0.024 0.017 0.017 
 
(-1.26) (-1.31) (1.50) (1.47) 
Herfindahl index 1.457*** 1.449*** 0.794*** 0.786*** 
 
(8.73) (8.68) (9.03) (8.95) 
Foreign acquisition 0.003 0.003 -0.008 -0.008 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (-0.29) (-0.29) 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.203 -0.192 -0.424 -0.412 
 
(-0.50) (-0.47) (-1.57) (-1.53) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,946 9,946 9,946 9,946 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of a random-effects probit analysis in columns 1 
and 2 and a random-effects Tobit analysis in columns 3 and 4. The dependent variable in the 
probit models takes the value one if the bidder’s two-digit SIC code differs from the target’s 
two-digit SIC code and zero otherwise. The Tobit analysis estimates the ratio of the sum of 
the values of diversifying acquisitions to the firm’s total assets. Variable definitions are given 
in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level. Marginal effects for 
bidder conservatism and highly conservative firms are reported in square brackets. T-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm for the probit 
models and bootstrapped for the Tobit models. The estimates in the models are statistically 
signiﬁcant at the (*)10%, (**)5%, and ***1% levels. We do not include industry-fixed 
effects in these models because we wish to observe the impact of bidder conservatism on our 
main variable of interest, the dependent variable, which is industrially diversified 
acquisitions.  
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Table 5. Does bidder conservatism affect the payment method used for M&As? 
 
(1) 
Stock dominated 
(2) 
Stock dominated  
(3) 
% of stock 
(4) 
% of stock 
Bidder conservatism 0.116**  0.064***  
[Marginal effects] [0.023]  [0.020]  
 
(2.20)  (2.68)  
Highly conservative firms  0.076*  0.041** 
[Marginal effects]  [0.015]  [0.013] 
  (1.69)  (1.97) 
Market leverage -0.050 -0.065 -0.008 -0.010 
 
(-0.37) (-0.49) (-0.14) (-0.16) 
Profitability -1.254*** -1.250*** -0.439*** -0.446*** 
 
(-7.99) (-8.01) (-7.66) (-7.80) 
Relative size 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
 
(9.70) (9.62) (14.11) (14.08) 
Bidder size -0.059*** -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
 
(-4.23) (-4.69) (-10.48) (-10.42) 
MTB 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 
(6.70) (6.70) (8.54) (8.55) 
Stock return 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.012 
 
(0.73) (0.77) (1.25) (1.27) 
Herfindahl index -0.758*** -0.769*** -0.303*** -0.300*** 
 
(-3.06) (-3.10) (-2.73) (-2.71) 
Foreign acquisition -0.360*** -0.358*** -0.208*** -0.208*** 
 
(-6.67) (-6.62) (-8.18) (-8.17) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.863 0.871 0.295 0.301 
 
(1.62) (1.64) (1.19) (1.22) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,946 9,946 9,946 9,946 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of random-effects probit analysis in columns 1 and 
2 and random-effects Tobit analysis in columns 3 and 4. The dependent variable in the probit 
models takes the value one if the deal is financed with more than 50% stock and zero if it is 
financed with more than 50% cash. The Tobit analysis estimates the percentage of stock 
financing in the M&A transactions. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level. Marginal effects for bidder conservatism 
and highly conservative firms are reported in square brackets. T-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm for the probit models and 
bootstrapped for the Tobit models. The estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at 
the (*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. 
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Table 6. Does bidder conservatism affect the market reaction to M&A deals? 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR_equally 
index 
CAR_equally 
index 
CAR_value 
index 
CAR_valu
e index 
Bidder conservatism -0.008*  -0.007*  
 
(-1.85)  (-1.71)  
Highly conservative firms  -0.005*  -0.005* 
  (-1.70)  (-1.68) 
Market leverage 0.027* 0.028* 0.025* 0.025* 
 
(1.93) (1.95) (1.78) (1.80) 
Profitability -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
 
(-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.63) (-0.60) 
Relative size 0.009** 0.009* 0.011** 0.011** 
 
(1.98) (1.95) (2.33) (2.30) 
Bidder size -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(-3.46) (-3.41) (-3.37) (-3.32) 
MTB -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(-2.64) (-2.64) (-2.65) (-2.66) 
Stock return 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.69) (0.69) (0.83) (0.83) 
Herfindahl index 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.020 
 
(0.60) (0.61) (0.67) (0.68) 
Foreign acquisition -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.30) (-0.30) 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.071 -0.071 -0.063 -0.062 
 (-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.19) (-1.19) 
Competed dummy 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Hostile dummy -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 
 
(-1.06) (-1.05) (-0.96) (-0.95) 
Pure cash acquisition 0.005** 0.005** 0.004 0.004 
 (2.05) (2.07) (1.52) (1.54) 
Pure stock acquisition -0.009** -0.009** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-2.44) (-2.44) (-2.68) (-2.68) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,701 9,701 9,701 9,701 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of fixed-effects OLS analyses. The dependent 
variable is the CAR (cumulative abnormal return) estimated over a three-day event window 
(from one day before to one day after the announcement date). For columns 1 and 2, the 
benchmark return is the equally weighted index of returns, and for columns 3 and 4 it is the 
value-weighted index of returns including dividends for the New York Stock Exchange, 
American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ combined. Variable definitions are given in 
Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level. The standardised betas 
for bidder conservatism and highly conservative firms are reported in square brackets. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by acquiring 
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firms. The estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*)10%, (**)5%, and 
(***)1% levels.  
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Unit 
Acquisition dummy Takes the value one if the firm makes an acquisition and 
zero otherwise. 
0, 1 
Bidder conservatism Frequency of negative words divided by total number of 
words in the 10-K, multiplied by 100, using Loughran 
and McDonald’s (2011) word list. 
% 
Bidder size Natural logarithm of sales ($million). LN 
CAR_equally index Cumulative abnormal returns estimated over a three-day 
event window (from one day before to one day after the 
announcement date). The benchmark return is the equally 
weighted index of returns.  
% 
CAR_value index Cumulative abnormal returns estimated over a three-day 
event window (from one day before to one day after the 
announcement date). The benchmark return is the value-
weighted index of returns, including dividends, for the 
New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, 
and NASDAQ combined. 
% 
Competed dummy Takes the value one if there is more than one bidder and 
zero otherwise. 
0, 1 
DIV2SIC Dummy variable that takes the value one if the bidder’s 
two-digit SIC code differs from that of the target, and 
zero otherwise. 
0, 1 
Diversifying acquisitions/ 
TA 
The ratio of the sum of diversifying acquisition values 
($million) to the firm’s total assets ($million). 
0, 1 
During financial crisis Dummy variable that takes the value one for the years 
2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise.  
0, 1 
During crisis* bidder 
conservatism 
An interaction term between the during financial crisis 
and bidder conservatism variables. 
% 
Foreign acquisition Dummy variable that takes the value one if a firm 
acquires a foreign target and zero otherwise. 
0, 1 
Herfindahl index The sum of the squares of sales ($million) of a firm 
divided by the sum of sales ($million) of all ﬁrms sharing 
the same three-digit SIC code. 
% 
Highly conservative firms Dummy variable that takes the value one if the bidder 
conservatism ratio for the firm is higher than the sample 
median and zero otherwise. 
0, 1 
Hostile dummy Takes the value one if the deal is a hostile acquisition and 
zero otherwise. 
0, 1 
Industry M&A liquidity Total acquisition value ($million), for each year and 
three-digit SIC code, scaled by the total assets ($million) 
of all US firms that share the same three-digit SIC code 
and year. 
% 
Market leverage Total debt ($million) divided by the sum of total debt plus 
the market value of equity ($million). 
% 
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Mixed payments method Dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
acquisition transaction is paid in both cash and stock, and 
zero otherwise. 
0, 1 
MTB Market value ($million) over the book value of total 
assets ($million). 
% 
% of stock Percentage of stock financing in the M&A transactions. % 
Post financial crisis Dummy variable that takes the value one for years after 
2009 and zero otherwise.  
0, 1 
Post crisis* bidder 
conservatism 
An interaction term between the post financial crisis and 
bidder conservatism variables. 
% 
Profitability Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciations 
($million) divided by total assets ($million). 
% 
Public dummy Takes the value one if the firm acquires a public target 
and zero if it acquires a non-public target. 
0, 1 
Pure cash acquisition Dummy variable that takes the value one if the whole 
transaction is paid for in cash and zero otherwise. 
0, 1 
Pure stock acquisition Dummy variable that takes the value one if the whole 
transaction is paid for in stock and zero otherwise. 
0, 1 
Relative size Natural logarithm of the ratio of the deal value ($million) 
to the acquirers’ total assets ($million) prior to the 
announcement date. 
LN 
Stand. bidder 
conservatism 
Bidder conservatism ratio minus its mean divided by its 
standard deviation, at the firm level. 
% 
Stand. conservative words The number of negative words minus the mean, divided 
by the standard deviation, at the firm level. 
% 
Stock dominated Dummy variable that takes the value one if the deal is 
financed with more than 50% stock and zero if financed 
with more than 50% cash. 
0, 1 
Sum of acquisitions/ TA The ratio of the sum of the acquisition values ($million) 
to the firm’s total assets ($million). 
% 
Sum of public 
acquisitions/ TA 
The ratio of the sum of public acquisition values 
($million) to the firm’s total assets ($million). 
% 
Stock return The compounded total stock returns one year prior to a 
firm’s fiscal year-end. 
% 
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Appendix B. Robustness check of the impact of bidder conservatism on the payment 
method for M&As 
 
(1) 
Pure stock vs. 
pure cash 
(2) 
Pure stock vs. 
pure cash 
(3) 
Mixed payment 
vs. pure cash 
(4) 
Mixed payment 
vs. pure cash 
Bidder conservatism 0.215**  0.151**  
 
(2.28)  (2.14)  
Highly conservative firms  0.138*  0.068 
  (1.66)  (1.17) 
Market leverage -0.767*** -0.788*** 0.189 0.167 
 
(-2.62) (-2.65) (1.21) (1.07) 
Profitability -2.906*** -2.961*** -1.351*** -1.407*** 
 
(-8.68) (-8.88) (-4.72) (-4.92) 
Relative size 1.137*** 1.137*** 0.979*** 0.980*** 
 
(8.27) (8.27) (7.37) (7.37) 
Bidder size -0.090*** -0.088*** -0.173*** -0.172*** 
 
(-2.66) (-2.60) (-9.78) (-9.70) 
MTB 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.009 0.009 
 
(5.20) (5.20) (1.25) (1.28) 
Stock return 0.057 0.058 0.070** 0.071** 
 
(1.36) (1.38) (2.13) (2.16) 
Herfindahl index -1.886*** -1.893*** -0.115 -0.128 
 
(-4.38) (-4.39) (-0.52) (-0.58) 
Foreign acquisition -0.515*** -0.514*** -0.206*** -0.206*** 
 
(-4.96) (-4.95) (-3.14) (-3.14) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.458 0.479 -0.265 -0.244 
 
(0.75) (0.78) (-0.46) (-0.42) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,946 9,946 9,946 9,946 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the multinomial-logit analysis. The dependent 
variable has three different categories, namely pure stock acquisitions, pure cash acquisitions 
and mixed payment methods. Pure stock acquisitions takes the value one if the whole 
transaction is paid for in stock and zero otherwise. Pure cash acquisitions takes the value one 
if the whole transaction is paid for in cash and zero otherwise. Mixed payments method takes 
the value one if the transaction is paid for in both cash and stock and zero otherwise. The 
estimated coefficients in this table report differences relative to the baseline group of pure 
cash acquisitions. Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficient estimates for pure stock acquisitions 
relative to the baseline group. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficient estimates for mixed 
payment methods relative to the baseline group. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 
A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level. T-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by acquiring firms. The estimates in the 
models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. 
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Appendix C. Robustness check of the effect of the standardised conservatism on the 
likelihood of undertaking acquisitions 
 
(1) 
Acquisition 
dummy 
(2) 
Acquisition 
dummy 
(3) 
Sum of 
acquisitions/ TA 
(4) 
Sum of 
acquisitions/ TA 
Stand. conservative words -0.053***  -0.035***  
 
(-4.78)  (-5.10)  
Stand. bidder conservatism  -0.054***  -0.044*** 
  (-4.91)  (-6.35) 
Market leverage -1.064*** -1.066*** -0.783*** -0.781*** 
 
(-18.28) (-18.40) (-19.52) (-19.52) 
Profitability 0.212*** 0.217*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 
 
(4.56) (4.65) (3.39) (3.46) 
Bidder size 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 
(12.86) (12.88) (5.34) (5.36) 
MTB 0.004** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(2.46) (2.42) (3.92) (3.86) 
Stock return 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 
 
(8.99) (9.03) (13.44) (13.47) 
Herfindahl index -0.169 -0.170 -0.130* -0.129 
 
(-1.61) (-1.63) (-1.65) (-1.63) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.090 0.099 -0.037 -0.026 
 
(0.36) (0.39) (-0.22) (-0.15) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 39,209 39,209 39,209 39,209 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of random-effects probit analysis in columns 1 and 
2 and random-effects Tobit analysis in columns 3 and 4. The dependent variable in the probit 
models takes the value one if the firm makes an acquisition. The Tobit analysis estimates the 
ratio of the sum of all the acquisition values to the firm’s total assets. Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level. T-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm for the probit models 
and bootstrapped for the Tobit models. The estimates in the models are statistically 
signiﬁcant at the (*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. 
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Appendix D. Robustness check of the effect of the standardised conservatism on 
acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR_equally 
index 
CAR_equally 
index 
CAR_value 
index 
CAR_value 
index 
Stand. conservative words -0.003*  -0.003*  
 (-1.91)  (-1.81)  
Stand. bidder conservatism  -0.002*  -0.002** 
  (-1.82)  (-2.14) 
Market leverage 0.014 0.018** 0.010 0.017** 
 
(0.85) (2.17) (0.65) (2.02) 
Profitability -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
 
(-0.56) (-1.30) (-0.70) (-1.13) 
Relative size 0.005 0.006** 0.006 0.008*** 
 
(0.98) (2.31) (1.14) (2.82) 
Bidder size -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.005*** 
 
(-3.63) (-3.50) (-3.56) (-3.38) 
MTB -0.002** 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 
 
(-2.22) (0.52) (-2.29) (0.49) 
Stock return 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.78) (-0.96) (0.87) (-1.07) 
Herfindahl index 0.043 -0.004 0.047 0.000 
 
(1.31) (-0.26) (1.47) (0.01) 
Foreign acquisition 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.07) (-0.30) (0.27) (-0.42) 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.070 -0.033 -0.063 -0.030 
 (-1.17) (-1.06) (-1.06) (-0.97) 
Competed dummy 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 
(0.52) (0.96) (0.46) (0.70) 
Hostile dummy -0.013 -0.016 -0.011 -0.014 
 
(-0.58) (-1.36) (-0.46) (-1.21) 
Pure cash acquisition 0.006** 0.004** 0.004 0.003** 
 (2.05) (2.53) (1.47) (1.96) 
Pure stock acquisition -0.008** -0.008*** -0.009** -0.008*** 
 (-2.02) (-3.85) (-2.27) (-3.99) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,691 9,691 9,691 9,691 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of fixed-effects OLS analyses. The dependent 
variable is CARs (cumulative abnormal returns) estimated over a three-day event window 
(from one day before to one day after the announcement date). The benchmark return in 
columns 1 and 2 is the equally weighted index of returns and in columns 3 and 4 is the value-
weighted index of returns, including dividends, for the New York Stock Exchange, American 
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ combined. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered by acquiring firms. The estimates in the models are 
statistically signiﬁcant at the (*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels.  
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Appendix E. Robustness check of the effect of bidder conservatism on the likelihood of 
undertaking acquisitions during the financial crisis 
 
(1) 
Acquisition 
dummy 
(2) 
Acquisition 
dummy 
(3) 
Sum of 
acquisitions/ 
TA 
(4) 
Sum of 
acquisitions/ TA 
Bidder conservatism -0.163*** -0.166*** -0.130*** -0.133*** 
 
(-6.47) (-6.27) (-7.95) (-7.74) 
Market leverage -1.103*** -1.103*** -0.821*** -0.821*** 
 
(-19.20) (-19.20) (-20.38) (-20.38) 
Profitability 0.272*** 0.271*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
 
(5.70) (5.68) (5.56) (5.53) 
Bidder size 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.010** 0.010** 
 
(10.41) (10.42) (2.08) (2.09) 
MTB 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(2.68) (2.66) (4.53) (4.52) 
Stock return 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 
 
(9.36) (9.36) (13.69) (13.69) 
Herfindahl index -0.234** -0.234** -0.203** -0.203** 
 
(-2.23) (-2.23) (-2.50) (-2.51) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.105 0.107 0.099 0.101 
 
(0.45) (0.46) (0.63) (0.64) 
During financial crisis -0.170*** -0.120 -0.144*** -0.102 
 (-5.23) (-0.77) (-6.46) (-0.94) 
Post financial crisis -0.078*** -0.183 -0.045** -0.140 
 (-2.58) (-1.25) (-2.33) (-1.48) 
During crisis*bidder conservatism  -0.027  -0.023 
  (-0.32)  (-0.39) 
Post crisis* bidder conservatism  0.058  0.053 
  (0.73)  (1.02) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 39,260 39,260 39,260 39,260 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of random-effects probit analysis in columns 1 and 
2 and random-effects Tobit analysis in columns 3 and 4. The dependent variable in the probit 
models takes the value one if the firm makes an acquisition. Tobit analysis estimates the ratio 
of the sum of the acquisition values to the firm’s total assets. Variable definitions are given in 
Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level. T-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm for the probit models and 
bootstrapped for the Tobit models. The estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at 
the (*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. 
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Appendix F. Robustness check of the effect of bidder conservatism on the acquirers’ 
cumulative abnormal returns during the financial crisis 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR_equally 
index 
CAR_equally 
index 
CAR_value 
index 
CAR_value 
index 
Bidder conservatism -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008* 
 (-2.09) (-2.03) (-1.98) (-1.95) 
Market leverage 0.027** 0.027** 0.025* 0.025* 
 
(1.97) (1.96) (1.79) (1.78) 
Profitability -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 
 
(-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.63) (-0.63) 
Relative size 0.009** 0.009** 0.011** 0.011** 
 
(2.01) (2.00) (2.36) (2.35) 
Bidder size -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 
(-4.59) (-4.57) (-4.46) (-4.44) 
MTB -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002** 
 
(-2.60) (-2.61) (-2.57) (-2.57) 
Stock return 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.94) (0.93) 
Herfindahl index 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 
 
(0.56) (0.55) (0.61) (0.60) 
Foreign acquisition -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.30) (-0.30) 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.082* -0.082* -0.063 -0.062 
 (-1.68) (-1.66) (-1.30) (-1.29) 
Competed dummy 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
Hostile dummy -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018 
 
(-0.99) (-0.99) (-0.94) (-0.93) 
Pure cash acquisition 0.005** 0.005** 0.004 0.004 
 (2.05) (2.05) (1.53) (1.52) 
Pure stock acquisition -0.008** -0.008** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-2.34) (-2.35) (-2.61) (-2.62) 
During financial crisis 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.008 
 (0.96) (0.44) (0.95) (0.36) 
Post financial crisis 0.012*** 0.008 0.011*** 0.005 
 (3.21) (0.41) (3.12) (0.28) 
During crisis*bidder conservatism  -0.003  -0.002 
  (-0.27)  (-0.19) 
Post crisis* bidder conservatism  0.002  0.003 
  (0.20)  (0.31) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,691 9,691 9,691 9,691 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of fixed-effects OLS analyses. The dependent 
variable is the CAR estimated over a three-day event window. The benchmark return in 
columns 1 and 2 is the equally weighted index of returns and in columns 3 and 4 is the value-
weighted index of returns. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous 
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variables are winsorised at the 1% level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered by acquiring firms. The estimates in the models are 
statistically signiﬁcant at the (*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
